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I.

INTRODUCTION

C
n
T
O
W
I

ompressed tactical decision cycles will be the fulcrum of future, fastpaced hyper-war. AI weapon systems promise to extend and maximize human capabilities, becoming essential to the survivability and lethality of
armed forces in this lethal operating environment. AI is not the weapon; it
is the component or element of a weapon system—most likely a military
network or “Military Internet of Things” that will accelerate the speed and
decision making in the application of fires or effects.1 The networked force
will inform enterprise-wide situational awareness and battle management.
Forces are unlikely to field “killer robots”—solitary entities carrying weapons and making life and death decisions free of human command. Instead,
creation and employment of autonomous weapon systems (AWS) will require a well-defined operational environment and access to rich, accurate,
extremely large data sets, such as GPS, fed by distributed sensors, plus improved machine learning algorithms and high-performance processors that
will fuse AI into the kill chain.2 The kill chain process combines multispectral
sensors to understand the warfighting environment, positively identify, track,
and select targets, and engage them with the most appropriate effects.3 (The
Soviet Union referred to this process as the “reconnaissance strike complex,” while in the 1990s, John Boyd in the United States popularized the
term, “OODA loop,” in which armed forces race to observe, orient, decide
and act before their adversary).4 AI is designed to facilitate this adaptive,
multi-domain, high velocity decision making model, and in doing so it is expected to provide a decisive military advantage. Part II of this study recounts
the current and potential uses of AI in the U.S. armed forces during armed
conflict.

1. CHRISTIAN BROSE, THE KILL CHAIN: DEFENDING AMERICA IN THE FUTURE OF
HIGH-TECH WARFARE 141–60 (2020).
2. Id. at xviii.
3. RICHARD S. DEAKIN, BATTLESPACE TECHNOLOGIES: NETWORK-ENABLED INFORMATION DOMINANCE 473–75 (2010).
4. Christian Brose, The New Revolution in Military Affairs, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, May-June
2019, at 122, 122–23 (Russian “strike-reconnaissance complex”); Bradley Perrett, China's
Growing Ability to Drive Away U.S. Forces, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Oct. 28,
2018, at 56 (China’s lethal kill chain); BARRY SCOTT ZELLEN, THE ART OF WAR IN AN
ASYMMETRIC WORLD: STRATEGY FOR THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 81–82 (2012) (describes
the “OODA loop”).
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In Part III, the study turns toward the rules applicable to the employment of AI in war. All methods and means of war, including AI, must conform to the law of war, also called the law of armed conflict (LOAC) or
international humanitarian law (IHL). Commanders are accountable for ensuring that methods and means at their disposal and under their command,
including AWS, comply with the principles of LOAC, such as distinction,
proportionality and the rule requiring precautions in attack.
Part IV explores an effort by the Member States of the Convention on
Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) to develop standards that will help
ensure compliance of AWS with LOAC. The CCW has convened a group
of governmental experts (GGE) to consider definitions to standardize levels
of human judgment or control over AWS in order to ensure that humans
remain accountable for the acts of machines. The GGE is focused most significantly on ensuring that the employment of Lethal AWS (LAWS) during
hostilities is consistent with LOAC. This work is designed to close a perceived “gap” in the law exposed by LAWS. Yet whatever standard emerges
from this process is unlikely to be an effective and reliable guide for ensuring
that AWS operating in compliance with LOAC.
Furthermore, some nongovernmental groups (NGOs) and concerned
States believe it would be unfair to hold a commander accountable for an
autonomous weapon system that acts unpredictably, but that is the way that
the military operates—imbuing military command with plenary authority
and accountability over the force.5 The CCW GGE effort is unlikely to produce detailed, widely accepted rules that meaningfully improve upon this
paradigm. Operational military commanders already are accountable for
their employment of AI weapon systems during armed conflict – the focus
of Part V.
Part V explores human accountability, embodied in the military commander. The military commander is accountable for the employment of AI
weapon systems and all lines of effort supporting the prosecution of the war
effort under his or her direction. Direct, individual command accountability
is longstanding and complete. The commensurate burden of accountability
for all military operations—including AI-enabled attacks in armed conflict—
resides at the top of the chain of command. This accountability may be in
the form of criminal law, but it also includes an array of administrative and
5. The NGOs are focused, it appears, solely on criminal accountability, which is a narrow subset of overall military accountability. It might be unfair to hold a commander criminally responsible for an autonomous system’s mistakes, but it would not be unfair to hold
the commander accountable in a broader sense.
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non-judicial measures. Direct accountability covers every occurrence that
unfolds during armed conflict, including those in which international criminal courts lack jurisdiction or have insufficient evidence, so it regulates commander’s behavior even when they lack criminal intent, and indeed, even if
they are not directly “at fault.”
Part VI concludes that the direct and individual accountability of the
commander has the benefit of being longstanding, widely understood, and
intuitively appreciated by line officers and military leaders; it is part of military culture. While it may utilize legal processes, including the military justice
system, it is not wholly encumbered by or dependent on them. While commanders are still subject to criminal penalties for war crimes, military accountability also includes an array of nonjudicial and administrative sanctions. The commander’s accountability over AI weapon systems is especially
compelling because unlike conventional weapons there are no additional persons (or fewer persons) on which to place the onus of blame if something
goes wrong.
II.

AI IN FUTURE U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS

The term “AI” generally means the “ability of a computer system to solve
problems and to perform tasks that would otherwise require human intelligence.”6 AI involves machines exercising executive functions to make independent, data-based decisions, but predefined behavioral boundaries may
limit the range of behaviors. Prediction is one of the most vexing tasks of
the operational commander. Achieving AI can be accomplished through several means, such as machine learning, deep learning, and edge computing.
Machine learning is a subset of AI that uses algorithms that can self-modify
and produces an AI model without direct human intervention. “To a large
extent, Machine Learning systems program themselves.”7 Deep learning involves numerous layers of these algorithms, with each layer analyzing the
data in an artificial “neural network” that compounds linear analysis and is
designed to imitate the functions of the brain. Networks may leverage the
power of “edge” computing that places computations and data storage in a
network distributed forward, at sea or on the battlefield, closer to the location where it is needed.
6. GREGORY C. ALLEN, UNDERSTANDING AI TECHNOLOGY 5 (2020), https://www.
ai.mil/docs/Understanding%20AI%20Technology.pdf.
7. Id. at 3.
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A. The DoD Approach to AI
The U.S. Defense Innovation Board proposes five ethical principles for the
employment of AI in defense, which were subsequently adopted by the Secretary of Defense on February 24, 2020.8 The principles require that such
systems be responsible, equitable, traceable, reliable, and governable.9 In applying these principles, the Department of Defense (DoD) requires its personnel to be “responsible for the development, deployment, and use” of AI
capabilities, while exercising “appropriate levels of judgment and care.” Further, DoD will take “deliberate steps to minimize unintended bias in AI capabilities.”10 Armed forces personnel that develop and deploy AI capabilities
must “possess an appropriate understanding of the technology, development
processes, and operational methods” applicable to such capabilities, including “transparent and auditable methodologies, data sources, and design procedure and documentation.”11 The “safety, security, and effectiveness” of AI
capabilities will be subject to testing and assurance throughout their lifecycles. DoD has directed its AI systems will also be reliable, having “explicit,
well-defined uses.” Lastly, the Pentagon will ensure that AI is engineered to
fulfill its intended function, and to “detect and avoid unintended
8. C. Todd Lopez, DoD Adopts Ethical Principles for Artificial Intelligence, DEFENSE.GOV
(Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2094085/dodadopts-5-principles-of-artificial-intelligence-ethics/; see also Press Release, U.S. Department
of Defense, DOD Adopts Ethical Principles for Artificial Intelligence (Feb. 24, 2020),
https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2091996/dod-adoptsethical-principles-for-artificial-intelligence/.
9. These form five pillars of U.S. development and employment of AI systems clustered
around:
(1) responsible use based on “appropriate levels of judgment and care;”
(2) equitable use that takes “deliberate steps to minimize unintended bias” in AI;
(3) use of AI that is “transparent and auditable,” such that DoD personnel understand
the technology, grasp how it is developed and its comprehend its operational applications;
(4) reliable of AI capabilities that are safe, secure and effective; and
(5) subject to governance designed to avoid unintended consequences, and that has
built in “kill switches” or “circuit breakers” to deactivate lethal systems that demonstrate
“unintended behavior.”
DEFENSE INNOVATION BOARD, AI PRINCIPLES: RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE ETHICAL
USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE: SUPPORTING
DOCUMENT 27–41 (2019), https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/31/2002204459/-1/1/0/DIB_AI_PRINCIPLES_SUPPORTING_DOCUMENT.PDF [hereinafter AI PRINCIPLES].
10. Id.
11. Id.
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consequences.”12 Systems that veer off course and display unexpected action
will be disengaged or deactivated.13
These principles should be read in conjunction with the definition of AI
in the FY 2019 National Defense Authorization Act:
(1) Any artificial system that performs tasks under varying and unpredictable circumstance without significant human oversight, or that can learn
from experience and improve performance when exposed to data sets.
(2) An artificial system developed in computer software, physical hardware,
or other context that solves tasks requiring human-like perception, cognition, planning, learning, communication, or physical action.
(3) An artificial system designed to think or act like a human, Including
cognitive architectures and neural networks.
(4) A set of techniques, including machine learning, that is designed to approximate a cognitive task.
(5) An artificial system designed to act rationally, including an intelligent
software agent or embodied robot that achieves goals using perception,
planning, reasoning, learning, communicating, decision making, and acting.14

This definition is further developed by the DoD Digital Modernization
Strategy, which defines AI as machines that perform tasks that inform or
reach decisions normally requiring human intelligence, such as pattern recognition, and forming conclusions and making predictions based upon “experience” (data).15
B. DoD and Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS)
DoD has embarked on a major effort to apply AI to national security missions, including autonomous weapons.16 Current AI military applications are
confined to automated or narrow, task-specific systems to execute pre12. Id.
13. Id.
14. John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub.

L. No. 115-232, § 238, 132 Stat. 1636 (2018).
15. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DIGITAL MODERNIZATION STRATEGY 44 (2019).
16. AI PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, at 29–34.
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defined undertakings assigned by human experts. While it may be decades
before general AI is achievable and integrated into the armed forces, defense
applications already use machine learning to aid a range of military activities,
from conducting predictive aircraft maintenance to processing intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance that inform military decisions.17
DoD defines autonomous weapons as those that, “once activated, can
select and engage targets without further intervention by the human operator.”18 This definition includes human-supervised autonomous weapons that
are designed to allow human operators to override the processes of the
weapon but can “select and engage targets without further human input”
after they are activated.19
The Pentagon has operated semi-autonomous (or more accurately, “automated”)20 systems for decades. The DoD defines “semi-autonomous
weapon systems” as:
A weapon system that, once activated, is intended to only engage individual
targets or specific target groups that have been selected by a human operator. This includes:
Semi-autonomous weapon systems that employ autonomy for engagement-related functions including, but not limited to, acquiring, tracking,
and identifying potential targets; cueing potential targets to human operators; prioritizing selected targets; timing of when to fire; or providing terminal guidance to home in on selected targets, provided that human control is retained over the decision to select individual targets and specific
target groups for engagement.21

The Navy’s Phalanx or “Close in Weapons System” (CIWS, or “Cwhiz”) is a semi-autonomous weapon system. The CIWS is part of the Aegis
17. Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., Artificial Intelligence Will Detect Hidden Targets in 2020 Wargame,
BREAKING DEFENSE (Oct. 21, 2019), https://breakingdefense.com/2019/10/artificial-intelligence-will-detect-hidden-targets-in-2020-wargame/.
18. U.S. Department of Defense, Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems 13
(2012) (Incorporating Change 1, May 8, 2017), https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/ Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/300009p.pdf [hereinafter DoD Directive 3000.09]. See also
United States, Characteristics of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc.
CCW/GGE.1/2017/WP.7 (Nov. 10, 2017).
19. DoD Directive 3000.09 supra note 18, at 13–14.
20. PAUL SCHARRE, ARMY OF NONE: AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS AND THE FUTURE OF
WAR 31 (2018).
21. Id. at 14.
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Combat System that integrates vertical-launch missiles and the Phalanx point
defense gattling gun into a comprehensive anti-air warfare and anti-ballistic
missile suite that can, if enabled, automatically track, target, and destroy incoming missiles and aircraft.22 Aegis integrates computer and radar technology that can be configured to independently detect, control and engage inbound enemy targets for anti-air warfare and ballistic missile defense functions.23 Humans are too slow to sort the data and make a timely decision.
The system is emblematic of automatic or semi-autonomous systems in that
humans control the production, programming, and application of the
weapon.24 The CIWS can be activated to run without humans “in the loop”
of decision making, subject to an operator’s decision to turn the system on
or off – relegating the human to “on the loop.” Semi-autonomous weapons
also include: “fire and forget” or “lock-on-after-launch” homing munitions
that rely on established tactics, techniques and procedures to maximize the
probability of striking only targets within the seeker’s “acquisition basket”
that have been pre-selected by a human operator.25 Aegis is in use by the
naval forces of the United States, Japan, Spain, Norway, Korea and Australia,
and is part of NATO’s European missile defense system. As hypersonic missiles enter the inventories of the China, Russia, and the United States, as well
as middle powers, France, Germany, Japan, and India, considerations such
as time compression will become even more imperative.26
The relationship between the weapon and the operator raises ethical and
legal issues regarding the role of humans, and the autonomy of machines, in
making life-and-death decisions during armed conflict. The ethical issues
concern the normative behavioral implications of using AI, while the legal
issues concern the applicability of international rules governing armed
22. Mk 15 – Phalanx Close-In Weapon System (CIWS), AMERICA’S NAVY, https://www.
navy.mil/Resources/Fact-Files/Display-FactFiles/Article/2167831/mk-15-phalanx-closein-weapon-system-ciws/#:~:text=MK%2015%20Phalanx%20CIWS%20provides,have
%20penetrated%20other%20fleet%20defenses (last updated Jan. 15, 2019). The Aegis
Combat System is used by naval forces of the United States, Japan, Spain, Norway, Korea,
and Australia, and is part of Japan’s and NATO’s European missile defense system.
23. Joseph T. Threston, The AEGIS Combat System, 121 NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL,
Oct. 2009, at 109, 111; Kelsey D. Atherton, Are Killer Robots the Future of War? Parsing the
Facts on Autonomous Weapons, NEW YORK TIMES (Nov 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/15/magazine/autonomous-robots-weapons.html.
24. PETER W. SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR: THE ROBOTICS REVOLUTION AND CONFLICT IN THE 21ST CENTURY 124–27 (2009).
25. DoD Directive 3000.09, supra note 18, at 14.
26. KELLEY M. SAYLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45811, HYPERSONIC WEAPONS:
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 16 (2020).
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conflict. AI may not be well-suited for all combat missions. There may be
insufficient data to generate accurate patterns of behavior or the data may
be ambiguous and not provide clear or tangible direction. AI may never be
appropriate, due to ethical considerations rather than legal barriers, for some
situations that pose catastrophic risk of failure, such as the decision to launch
nuclear weapons. Even some tactical situations pose particularly complex
problems that may require exceptionally nuanced trade-offs, special empathy, or choices among seemingly divergent ethics, or that implicate direct
individual accountability. While there are clear situations in which the use of
AI may not be appropriate, that does not obviate the technological imperative to apply AI throughout the networked force.
III.

AWS AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

Like any other method or means of warfare, AWS is subject to legal and
policy considerations in design, development, testing, evaluation, and use.
The United States has stated that “[a]lthough technology changes, the U.S.
commitment to the law of war . . . does not.”27 The use of AWS in the kill
chain must comply with LOAC.28 LOAC stipulates that the right of

27. Christopher A. Ford, AI, Human-Machine Interaction, and Autonomous Weapons: Thinking Carefully About Taking ‘Killer Robots’ Seriously, 1 ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY PAPERS 1, 2 (2020).
28. The law of armed conflict is also referred to as “international humanitarian law,”
and forms the body of rules and regimes that regulate armed conflict. It is generally regarded
as synonymous with the “law of war.” OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF WAR MANUAL § 1.3.1.2 (rev. ed., Dec. 2016) [hereinafter DOD
LAW OF WAR MANUAL]; id. § 2.2; HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS, FM 6-27/MCTP 11-10C, THE COMMANDER’S
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE ¶¶ 1–4 (2019) [hereinafter COMMANDER’S
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE]; U.S. NAVY, U.S. MARINE CORPS & U.S.
COAST GUARD, NWP 1-14M/MCTP 11-10B/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS § 5.1 (2017) [hereinafter
COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS].
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combatants to choose their methods or means of warfare is not unlimited.29
States are responsible for ensuring that their armed forces comply with
LOAC.30
A. DoD Legal Review of Weapons and Weapon Systems
States Party to Additional Protocol I must subject any new “weapon, means
or method” of warfare to legal review to ensure that its employment is not
prohibited by law.31 The U.S. position is that only weapons (means) must be
reviewed as a matter of customary international law.32 DoD tests, evaluates,
and reviews weapons in accordance with their proposed use in physical and
operational environments, anticipated rules of engagement, concepts of operations, and tactics, techniques and procedures that would govern their use.
Weapons review must ensure new weapons or munitions do not cause suffering that is manifestly disproportionate to the military advantage reasonably expected from their use. States must determine whether a weapon can
be controlled in such a manner that it is capable of being directed against a
lawful target. In this regard, autonomous or semi-autonomous weapons undergo special reviews by the military Services and DoD before they enter
formal development.33
Although the United States is not a State Party to Additional Protocol I,
it conducts a legal review of all new weapons to ensure they “comply with
applicable treaties and international agreements . . . customary international

29. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 22, Oct. 18, 1907,
36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter Hague Regulations]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 35(1), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional
Protocol I].
30. Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 3, Oct.
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539.
31. Additional Protocol I, supra note 29, art. 36 (new weapons). It is debatable whether
this rule has crystallized into customary international law. See Natalia Jevglevskaja, Weapons
Review Obligation under Customary International Law, 94 INTERNATIONAL LAW. STUDIES 186,
220–21 (2018).
32. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 28, § 6.2; COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 28, ¶ 2-4; COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra note 28, § 9.1.
33. DoD Directive 3000.09, supra note 18, encl. 4, ¶ 8(b).
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law, and the law of armed conflict.”34 This review is one component of the
DoD Law of War Program, which establishes policy to “comply with the
law of war during all armed conflicts . . . and in all other military operations.”35 The requirement is implemented, in part, by the armed services
through the uniformed judge advocates.36
Sometimes the lawfulness of a method or means of warfare is debatable.
For example, during the Vietnam War, the United States coupled airpower
with the widespread use of anti-personnel weapons, napalm and cluster munitions, and it employed the new, small-caliber (5.56x45mm) M-16 rife, engaged in the Phoenix Program of political assassination, and destroyed crops
to deprive insurgents of food in the countryside.37 While States may differ in
their interpretation of the lawfulness of weapons, the key to the rule of law
is that those who develop and employ weapons, and those who decide upon
their use, have certain duties under LOAC.38
New weapons may require clarification of existing law or development
of new law to ensure they balance considerations of humanity and military
necessity.39 It is not foreseeable that the mere incorporation of AI into a
34. U.S. Department of Defense, DoD Directive 5000.01, The Defense Acquisition
System 9 (2020) [hereinafter DoD Directive 5000.01]. See also U.S. Department of Defense,
DoD Instruction 5500.15, Review of Legality of Weapons under International Law (1974).
35. U.S. Department of Defense, DoD Directive 2311.01, DoD Law of War Program
§ 1.2(a) (2020), http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/231101e.pdf [hereinafter
DoD Directive 2311.01].
36. See Headquarters, Department of the Army, AR 27-53, Legal Review of Weapons
and Weapons Systems ¶ 4.f (2019) (“The Judge Advocate General’s designee. TJAG’s designee will––(1) Review weapons and weapon systems, including cyber weapons and cyber
weapon systems, in accordance with this regulation to determine whether the weapons,
weapon systems, cyber weapons, and cyber weapon systems and their intended use in combat are consistent with the international legal standards considered binding by the United
States Government, whether derived from international agreements, customary international law, or a combination thereof.”); see also Secretary of the Navy, SECNAVINST
5000.2F, Defense Acquisition System and Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System Implementation, encl. 3, ¶ 10(a) (2019) (“All potential weapons and weapon systems
developed, acquired, or procured by the DON will be reviewed by the Judge Advocate
General (JAG) of the Navy to ensure that the intended use of such weapons or weapon
systems is consistent with domestic and international law.”); Secretary of the Air Force, AFI
51-401, The Laws of War ¶ 2.1.2 (2018).
37. W. Hays Parks, Means and Methods of Warfare, 38 GEORGE WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 511, 512 (2006); Richard Falk, Law and Responsibility in Warfare: The
Vietnam Experience, 4 INSTANT RESEARCH ON PEACE AND VIOLENCE 1, 4–8 (1974).
38. WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, WEAPONS AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 283 (2009).
39. Additional Protocol I, supra note 29, art. 1(2) (general principles and scope of application).
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weapon system would make a new weapon unlawful, as AI is not prohibited
or restricted by any specific rule of law or treaty.40
B. DoD Compliance with LOAC
LOAC is “that part of international law that regulates the resort to armed
force; the conduct of hostilities and the protection of war victims in both
international and non-international armed conflict; belligerent occupation;
and the relationships between belligerent, neutral, and non-belligerent
States.”41 It is DoD policy to comply with LOAC “during all armed conflicts,
however characterized. In all other military operations, members of the DoD
Components will continue to act consistent with the law of war’s fundamental principles and rules.”42 This duty includes the obligation to “respect and
to ensure respect” found in the the 1949 Geneva Conventions.43 Compliance
with LOAC conditions military effectiveness, encourages reciprocity by the
40. For example, the Russia Poseidon nuclear-armed underwater drone appears to be
an unlawful weapon, per se, under the ENMOD Convention. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques art. 1(1),
May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333, 1108 U.N.T.S. 151. See Dave Makichuk, Russia to Test ‘Doomsday
Drone’ in High Arctic, ASIA TIMES (May 26, 2020), https://asiatimes.com/2020/05/russiaset-to-test-doomsday-drone-in-high-arctic/; Franz-Stefan Gady, Russia (Once Again) Announces Start of Sea Trials of ‘Doomsday Weapon,’ THE DIPLOMAT (Dec 27, 2018), https://thediplomat.com/2018/12/russia-once-again-announces-start-of-sea-trials-of-doomsdayweapon/. Russia (May 30, 1978), China (June 8, 2005), Japan (June 9, 1982), the United
States (January 17, 1980), and the United Kingdom (May 16, 1978) are parties as of the date
indicated to the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques. Disarmament: Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any
Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20II/Chapter%20XXVI/XXVI-1.en.pdf (last visited Jan. 25,
2021).
41. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 28, § 1.3; COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 28, ¶¶ 1-4–1-6; COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra note 28, § 5.2.
42. DoD Directive 2311.01, supra note 35, § 1.2(a) .
43. Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
the Armed Forces in the Field art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Convention (III) Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135
[hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter
Geneva Convention IV].
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adversary, and builds political support and legitimacy at home.44 Rules of
LOAC are based on key principles formed through treaties and customary
international law, and mandate that the use of force in armed conflict is
based on the principles of military necessity, humanity, proportionality, distinction, and honor or chivalry. New tactics and weapons technology must
be evaluated to ensure they can be used in armed conflicts in accordance
with these principles, and States have a duty to ensure that Soldiers, Sailors,
Marines, and Airmen use them in that lawful fashion.
Military necessity justifies the use of all measures needed to defeat the
enemy quickly and efficiently, so long as the methods and means employed
are not otherwise prohibited by the law of war.45 Destruction, seizure of persons and property, and alternate means of subduing an enemy, such as propaganda and intelligence gathering, are all justified during armed conflict,
while causing unnecessary suffering is prohibited.
Combatants are entitled to inflict destruction, injury, and death on enemy
combatants and lawful military targets.46 The principle of humanity, however, forbids the infliction of suffering, injury, or destruction beyond what is
necessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose.47 Elementary considerations of humanity may be regarded as the inverse of military necessity,
44. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL , supra note 28, § 18.2.
45. Id. § 2.2; COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note
28, ¶¶ 1-23–1-27; COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS supra
note 28, § 5.3.1. See also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J Rep. 226, ¶ 140 (July 8); 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW r. 70 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005). For historical context, see U.S. Department of War, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United
States in the Field, General Orders No. 100, Apr. 24, 1863 (commonly referred to as the
Lieber Code).
46. Exec. Order No. 13,732, 3 C.F.R. § 13732 (2016); Jennifer O’Connor, General
Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense, Address at NYU School of Law: Applying the Law
of Targeting to the Modern Battlefield (Nov. 28, 2016), JUST SECURITY, https://www.justsecurity.org/34977/applying-law-targeting-modern-battlefield%E2%80%8E-full-speechdod-general-counsel-jennifer-oconnor/ (“The citizen who does not participate in hostilities
is to be spared in person, property, and honor as much as the exigencies of war will admit.”).
47. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 28, § 2.3; COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 28, ¶¶ 1-28–1-30; COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra note 28, § 5.3.2. See also Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 218
(June 27). For historical context, see 2 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 67, at
227 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952) (The principle of humanity “postulates that all
such kinds and degrees of violence as are not necessary for the overpowering of the opponent should not be permitted to a belligerent.”).
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since unnecessary actions are prohibited.48 Generally, suffering is unnecessary if it is the inevitable result of the normal use and reasonably anticipated
effects of military action that is needless, superfluous, or manifestly disproportionate in relation to the anticipated military advantage.49
The principle of proportionality dictates that combatants must refrain
from attacks in which the expected loss or injury to civilians and damage to
civilian objects are excessive compared to the anticipated concrete and direct
military advantage.50 The principle of proportionality does not spare civilians
from harm that results from attacks, but the harm to civilians or civilian objects, or collateral damage, must not be excessive in relation to the expected
military advantage.
Distinction requires parties to a conflict to distinguish between the
armed forces and the civilian population.51 Methods and means of warfare
must discriminate between military and non-military targets, and especially
between combatants and civilians. Additional Protocol I states that precautions in attack also encompass a duty by defending belligerents to “endeavor
to remove” the civilian population from the vicinity of military objectives, a
concept which overlaps with the principle of distinction.52 The United States
is not a State Party to AP I, but customary international law requires parties

48. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 22 (Apr. 9); DOD LAW
OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 28, § 2.3.1.1.
49. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 28, § 6.6; COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 28, ¶¶ 1–28. See also MARCO SASSÒLI, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: RULES, SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS ARISING IN WARFARE
AND CONTROVERSIES § 8.368 (2019).
50. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 28, §§ 2.4, 5.1.2.5; COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 28, ¶¶ 1-44–1-48; COMMANDER’S
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra note 28, §§ 5.3.3, 9.1.2. See also
Additional Protocol I, supra note 29, arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(b); 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 45, at 14; Letter from Mr. Webster to Mr. Fox (Apr. 24,
1841), 29 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1840-1841, at 1129 (1857).
51. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 28, § 2.5; COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 28, ¶¶ 1-34–1-43; COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra note 28, § 5.3.4. For historical context, see Letter
from J. Fred Buzhardt, General Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense, to Senator Edward
Kennedy (Sept. 22, 1972), reprinted in 67 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 122
(1973); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30 (1942) (“By universal agreement and practice, the
law of war draws a distinction between the armed forces and the peaceful populations of
belligerent nations . . . .”).
52. Additional Protocol I, supra note 29, art. 58 (precautions against the effects of attacks).
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to a conflict, “to the extent feasible,” to remove civilian persons and objects
under its control “from the vicinity of military objectives.”53
Not only must attacks comply with the rule of proportionality and distinction, but combatants also must ensure feasible precautions are taken to
reduce incidental harm to civilians, other protected persons, and civilian objects.54 Feasible precautions are those that are practicable or practically possible, taking into account all circumstances prevailing at the time, including
humanitarian and military considerations.55 Such precautions are wide ranging. Depending on the weapon system and the operating environment, precautions may require combatants to have an intimate grasp of how the
weapon system functions and its relationship with that environment.
While not legally required for the deployment of every AWS, potential
safeguards may include the following warning and monitoring mechanisms:
•
•
•
•
•
•

operating status of the weapon system in real time so the commander
can ensure it is operating within its programmed parameters;
override functions;
ability to assert positive human control during operations;
ability to enable or disable learning functions;
checks on how the system acquires and develops “learned behavior;”
and
resistance to cyberattack and associated counter measures to include
system shutdown.

53. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 45, r. 24.
54. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 28, § 5.11; COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 28, ¶¶ 1-44–1-45; COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra note 28, § 8.3.1. See also Additional Protocol I,
supra note 29, art. 57. Thanks to Lieutenant Colonel John Cherry, USMC, and Squadron
Leader Kieran Tinkler, RAF, both of the Stockton Center for International Law, who contributed to this analysis.
55. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 28, § 5.14; COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 28, ¶ 2-12; COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra note 28, § 8.3.1.
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Combatants also must understand the targeting functions of the system,
to include:
•
•
•
•
•

how the weapon system defines targets;56
ensuring that target functionality is set within only pre-defined
boundaries;
geographic restrictions;
setting temporal restrictions on operation;
the ability of the AWS to transition to preconfigured tests and a “safe
state” in the event of critical systems failure.

Some of these safeguards may imply real-time control over the system,
e.g. the ability to assert positive human control during operation and override functions. This element is not legally essential, however. Many existing
weapons without AI cannot be recalled or aborted and lack positive human
control during operations, so imposing additional restrictions for AI systems
would be an extraordinary decision based on policy and not the law.
Chivalry or honor is a core value of U.S. armed forces, and reflects an
historic canon of fairness and observance of formalities and courtesies that
forbid breaking trust with the enemy.57 In particular, honor requires good
faith on the part of belligerents to refrain from taking advantage of an opponent’s adherence to the law by falsely claiming the law’s protections, as in
offering a false surrender in the hope of ambushing enemy forces.
The principles pose challenges in the context of fully autonomous weapons because such they do not yet exist and there are competing visions for
how they will operate during armed conflict. The debate over the legality of
AWS is driven by concern that such weapons must have a sufficiently rich
human role in their design, production and operation, to ameliorate ethical
concerns and ensure human accountability for compliance with LOAC.
These issues are playing out at discussions held under the auspices of the
UN Convention of Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) through a Group
of Governmental Experts (GGE).
56. The commander would have to know how an AI system would define a target or,
in the alternative, how a system would act on the identification of the target by a human.
57. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 28, § 2.6.2.2; COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 28, ¶¶ 1-31–1-33; COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra note 28, § 5.3.5. For historical context, see 2
LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE §§ 67, 84–85 (Ronald F. Roxburgh
ed., 3rd ed. 1921).
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CCW GGE FOCUS ON HUMAN-MACHINE INTERACTION

The CCW effort is focused on identifying concerns and developing general
principles associated with human-machine interaction, applicability of international law, and examining how those principles may be operationalized.
Many believe new standards governing AI in military systems are required to
ensure some threshold level of human interface or control in order to close
a perceived gap in accountability.58 “Smart” machines, they believe, defy “traditional ways of ascription” because no person has enough control to be
accountable for them.59 If AI fails to account for LOAC as effectively as a
human mind, where does accountability lie? This view suggests that the manufacturer cannot be held liable for acts that it could not have predicted or
even foreseen.60 For proponents of regulation, it seems equally unfair to impose liability on commanders for actions of machines over which they
“could not have sufficient control.”61
To address these questions, in 2013 the High Contracting Parties of the
CCW decided to convene the following year an informal gathering of a meeting of experts to consider LAWS and their potential compatibility and compliance with LOAC, in particular, the principles of international humanitarian law, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the Martens Clause and customary
law.62 The CCW already regulates certain conventional weapons, with protocols that prohibit the use of non-detectable fragments (Protocol I), regulate
employment of landmines and booby-traps (Protocol II) and incendiary

58. See, e.g., Chairperson, Report of the 2014 Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal
Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), U.N. Doc. CCW/MSP/2014/3 (June 11, 2014)
[hereinafter Report of 2014 Informal Meeting of Experts]; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, MIND
THE GAP: THE LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY FOR KILLER ROBOTS (2015),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/04/09/mind-gap/lack-accountability-killer-robots.
59. Andreas Matthias, The Responsibility Gap: Ascribing Responsibility for the Actions of Learning Automata, 6 ETHICS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 176, 177 (2004).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 183.
62. Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Final Report, U.N. Doc.
CCW/MSP/2013/10 (Dec. 16, 2013); Report of 2014 Informal Meeting of Experts, supra
note 58, ¶ 26. See also Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137.
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weapons (Protocol III), prohibit the use of blinding lasers (Protocol IV), and
regulate explosive remnants of war (Protocol V).63
From 2014 to 2016, informal meetings of experts were convened to explore these questions within the framework of the CCW.64 In 2015, Germany
as chair, submitted a “Food for Thought” paper that outlined many of the
military, technological, ethical, and legal issues associated with the use of
LAWS.65 In 2016, the Chairperson of the meeting, Ambassador Michael Biontino of Germany, prepared for submission to the CCW Review Conference a paper in his personal capacity containing recommendations for establishment of a CCW Group of Government Experts (GGE) to begin meeting
in 2017 to address options relating to emerging technologies and LAWS.66
Accountability has been central to the debate over autonomous weapons
at the GGE.67 Meeting in 2017, the GGE held discussions on LAWS
63. See Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 168 (Protocol I); Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and
Other Devices, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 168 (Protocol II); Protocol on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as Amended on 3 May
1996 May 3, 1996, 2048 U.N.T.S. 93 (Protocol II, amended); Protocol on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 171 (Protocol
III); Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons, Oct. 13, 1995, 2024 U.N.T.S. 163 (Protocol IV);
Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions
on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, Nov. 28, 2003, 2399 U.N.T.S. 100 (Protocol V).
64. Report of 2014 Informal Meeting of Experts, supra note 58; Chairperson, Informal
Meeting of Experts, Revised Annotated Programme of Work for the Informal Meeting of
Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems Geneva, 13 – 17 April 2015, U.N. Doc.
CCW/MSP/2015/WP.1/Rev.1 (Mar. 11, 2015).
65. Chairperson, Food-for-Thought Paper, U.N. Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2017/WP.1
(Sept. 4, 2017).
66. Chairperson, Report of the 2016 Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) annex, U.N. Doc. CCW/CONF.V/2 (June 2, 2016) (Recommendations to the 2016 Review Conference).
67. Group of Governmental Experts of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which
May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Report of
the 2018 Session of the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the
Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/3
(Oct. 23, 2018) [hereinafter Report of the 2018 Session of the GGE]; Group of Governmental Experts of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Report of the 2017 Session Group of
Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), ¶¶ 21(b), 23(a),
424

Command Accountability for AI Weapon Systems

Vol. 97

technology, military effects, and ethical and legal issues based on the Chairperson’s 2015 “Food for Thought” paper.68 The GGE met twice in both
2018 and 2019.69
The lines of argument have coalesced around whether LAWS should be
subject to a new CCW protocol.70 Some States propose negotiation of Protocol VI to the Convention to regulate or even ban LAWS – the latter option
is supported by some NGOs.71 Although the ICRC has not joined the call
for a ban, it is moving in the direction of support for drafting a new protocol,
at least to clarify the scope of human control in LAWS.72 The European
Parliament seeks a binding treaty to stop the development, production, or
use of LAWS.73 The Non-aligned Movement supports that outcome as well,
U.N. Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2017/3 (Dec. 22, 2017) [hereinafter Report of the 2017 Session
of the GGE]. See also Carrie McDougall, Autonomous Weapon Systems and Accountability: Putting
the Cart Before the Horse, 4 MELBOURNE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 58, 74–76 (2019).
68. Group of Governmental Experts of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which
May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Report of
the 2017 Session Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) (Advanced Version), U.N. Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2017/CRP.1 (Nov. 20, 2017)
[hereinafter Report of the 2017 Session of the GGE (Advanced Version)]; Report of the
2017 Session of the GGE, supra note 67.
69. Report of the 2018 Session of the GGE, supra note 67; Group of Governmental
Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons System,
Report of the 2019 Session of the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, U.N. Doc.
CCW/GGE.1/2019/3 (Sept. 25, 2019).
70. Report of the 2017 Session of the GGE, supra note 67, ¶ 10.
71. Matthew Bolton, Membership Secretary, International Committee for Robot Arms
Control, Closing Statement to the 2015 U.N. CCW Expert Meeting, ICRAC (Apr. 17, 2015),
https://www.icrac.net/icrac-closing-statement-to-the-2015-un-ccw-expert-meeting/;
CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS, KEY ELEMENTS OF A TREATY ON FULLY AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS 3 (2019), https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/
03/Key-Elements-of-a-Treaty-on-Fully-Autonomous-Weapons.pdf [hereinafter KEY ELEMENTS OF A TREATY].
72. International Committee of the Red Cross, Statement to the Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons (CCW) Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous
Weapons Systems, March 25–29, 2019, Geneva, https://www.unog.ch/
80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/59013C15951CD355C12583CC002FDAFC/$file/CC
W+GGE+LAWS+ICRC+statement+agenda+item+5e+27+03+2019.pdf; Views of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on Autonomous Weapon System, ICRC (Apr 11,
2016), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/views-icrc-autonomous-weapon-system.
73. Resolution on the Use of Armed Drones ¶ I.2(d), EUR. PARL. DOC.
2014/2567(RSP) (2014), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-7-20140172_EN.html.
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viewing a new protocol essential to ensuring autonomous functions remain
under the “direct control and supervision of humans at all times.” 74 Nearly
thirty nations support banning LAWS. Austria and Brazil are among the
most vocal, but the list also includes Algeria, Bolivia, Cuba, Costa Rica, Cuba,
Ecuador, Egypt, Ghana, Guatemala, Holy See, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan,
Panama, Palestine, Peru, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe.75
Russia’s position is that each State should set their own standards.76 The
United States opposes a ban.77 Thus far, no NATO State has supported a
ban. China purports to support a ban, but it defines LAWS exceedingly narrowly, to include systems with the “impossibility for termination” and that
operate with “indiscriminate effect.”78 Such weapons are unlawful anyway,
so the Chinese proposal to “ban” them is entirely specious. The wayward
Chinese definition of LAWS underscores that there is no agreement on how
to meaningfully and accurately characterize what it encompasses.
It is impractical to satisfy the most aspirational desires to ban such
LAWS; indeed, semi-autonomous weapons already exist and includes a variety of automated weapons that have been employed by over thirty countries
for over thirty years.79 In great power competition, the logic of deterrence
means major powers must develop AI systems, if only to deter potential adversaries. In this sense, systems that use AI will become essential to strategic
security. Consequently, talk of banning them is simply unrealistic, particularly
since CCW makes decisions by consensus. Most States agree there is a need
74. Venezuela on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and Other States Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, General Principles on Lethal
Autonomous Weapons, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2017/WP.10 (Nov. 13, 2017).
75. Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, Country Views on Killer Robots (Mar. 11, 2020),
https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/KRC_CountryViews_
11Mar2020.pdf.
76. Russian Federation, Russia’s Approaches to the Elaboration of a Working Definition and Basic Functions of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems in the Context of the
Purposes and Objectives of the Convention, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.6
(Apr. 4, 2018) [hereinafter Russia’s Approaches to the Elaboration of a Working Definition
and Basic Functions of LAWS].
77. United States, Humanitarian Benefits of Emerging Technologies in the Area of
Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, ¶ 40, U.N. Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.4 (Mar.
28, 2018).
78. China, Position Paper, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.7 (Apr. 11, 2018).
See also COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶ 1463 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno
Zimmermann eds., 1987).
79. Chris Jenks, False Rubicons, Moral Panic & Conceptual Cul-De-Sacs: Critiquing & Reframing the Call to Ban Lethal Autonomous Weapons, 44 PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 1, 1 (2016).
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for some form of human involvement in the design, development, and use
of LAWS but stand against new regulation. A new CCW protocol that regulates LAWS without banning them is viewed as a middle ground, although
even that may not materialize.80
There are two streams of thought that have been put forward to further
specify that potential new standard: “meaningful human control” and “appropriate levels of human judgement.”81
A. “Meaningful Human Control”
The U.K. non-governmental organization Article 36 seeks adoption of an
explicit requirement for “meaningful human control” over the operation of
AI weapon systems, and specifically over every individual attack.82 Numerous States support this standard, although the definitions of the term vary.83
Austria supports this standard because it views LAWS as by their nature lying
outside of “meaningful human control.”84 The problem with “meaningful
human control” as a standard is that like LAWS itself there is not a single
interpretation of the term. Some consider it as a concept that ensures human
80. Austria, Brazil & Chile, Proposal for a Mandate to Negotiate a Legally Binding
Instrument that Addresses the Legal, Humanitarian and Ethical Concerns Posed by Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), U.N. Doc.
CCW/GGE.2/2018/WP.7 (Aug. 30, 2018).
81. Report of 2014 Informal Meeting of Experts, supra note 58, ¶ 20; United States,
Human-Machine Interaction in the Development, Deployment and Use of Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems U.N. Doc.
CCW/GGE.e/2018/WP.4 (Aug. 28, 2018), https://unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/
(httpAssets)/7C177AE5BC10B588C125825F004B06BE/$file/CCW_GGE.1_2018_WP.
4.pdf [hereinafter United States, Human-Machine Interaction].
82. Austria, The Concept of “Meaningful Human Control” (Lethal Autonomous
Weapons System, Expert Meeting, Geneva, April 13–17, 2015, Working Paper) [hereinafter
Austria Working Paper]. See also Merel Ekelhof, Autonomous Weapons: Operationalizing Meaningful Human Control, HUMANITARIAN LAW & POLICY (Aug. 15, 2018),
https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/ 2018/08/15/autonomous-weapons-operationalizing-meaningful-human-control/.
83. See, e.g., Sandra de Jongh, Policy Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands,
Statement delivered at Group of Governmental Experts on LAWS (Apr. 26, 2019),
https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/164DD121FDC25A0BC1258
3CB003A99C2/$file/5b+NL+Statement+Human+Element-final.pdf.
84. Laura Boillot, Program Manager for Article36, Statement at the 2015 Informal
Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS): On the Way Forward (Apr. 17, 2015), https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/
24D931F6FCC8C43DC1257E2D002D9021/$file/2015_LAWS_MX_Art36_W.A.pdf.
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control during the operation of a weapon (throughout the duration of an
attack). Many proponents argue there is a temporal link between the initial
assessment of LOAC in the context of conditions that justify using a
weapon, and the assessment that is ongoing throughout the duration of the
attack. If this link is broken, it raises problems with the human control over
implementation of the law of war—in particular, the principles of proportionality, distinction and precautions. Austria questions whether a proportionality assessment made on the front end of the kill chain will be valid by
the time the ordinance lands on the target.85 The concern arises because the
battlespace is dynamic. There is a risk that human-informed decisions programmed into LAWS before an attack will not be durable throughout the
entire kill chain, as conditions quickly change.86 The principle of proportionality requires an unbroken temporal link between the plan and the lethal
strike so that proportionality is re-evaluated at each step of the chain. The
related concept of precautions in attack may also be difficult for LAWS to
implement without human intervention because it is unclear whether the initial plans reviewed by humans and executed by the machine would be capable of adjusting to dynamic battlefield conditions.87 Michael C. Horowitz and
Paul Scharre defined meaningful human control as a three-part test, which
has become another influential standard for the term:
1. Human operators are making informed, conscious decisions about the
use of weapons;
2. Human operators have sufficient information to ensure the lawfulness
of the action they are taking, given what they know about the target, the
weapon, and the context for action;
3. The weapon is designed and tested, and human operators are properly
trained, to ensure effective control over the use of the weapon. 88

The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots states that attacks that lack “meaningful human control” are unethical because they undermine human dignity
by delegating “life-and-death decisions to inanimate machines” unable to
comprehend the value of human life.89 This approach finds it repugnant that
85. Austria Working Paper, supra note 82.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. MICHAEL C. HOROWITZ & PAUL SCHARRE, MEANINGFUL HUMAN CONTROL IN
WEAPON SYSTEMS: A PRIMER 4 (2015), https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/Ethical_Autonomy_Working_Paper_031315.pdf?mtime=20160906082316.
89. KEY ELEMENTS OF A TREATY, supra note 71, at 3.
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targeting during armed conflict could be done without control by a “true
moral agent in the form of a human,” who has a “conscience and the faculty
of moral judgment,” even if human judgment is inherently flawed. 90 Machines would be worse, they suggest, because they are incapable of the judgment required to comply with LOAC, such as weighing the proportionality
of an attack. For example, Austria suggests that it is problematic to delegate
to a robot weapon the assessment of whether an enemy soldier is “hors de
combat.”91 In this view, it is unrealistic that LAWS could distinguish whether
an enemy soldier was wounded or in the process of surrendering.92 (It has
been thirty years, however, since five Iraqi soldiers attempted to surrender
to an unarmed U.S. Pioneer unmanned aerial vehicle).93
Proponents of “meaningful human control,” suggest “‘meaningful’, ‘effective’ or ‘appropriate’ human control would be the type and degree of control that preserves human agency and upholds moral responsibility in decisions to use force.”94 “Control,” advocates say, is a higher and broader standard than alternatives, such as “judgment.” “Meaningful” control qualifies
that such control must be more than superficial and is “less specific or outcome driven” than alternatives, such as “appropriate” or “effective” control.95 This standard requires a sufficiently direct and close connection to be
maintained between the human intent of the user and the eventual consequences of the operation of the weapon system in a specific attack. A human
must always be “in the loop,” particularly for selecting and engaging targets.
But this position arguably bans LAWS, since such systems cease to be autonomous.96
More human control, however, does not necessarily mean more meaningful human control. If LAWS have greater accuracy, for example, they may
be able to better identify and more accurately strike a specific location on a
90. Kenneth Anderson & Matthew Waxman, Law and Ethics for Robot Soldiers, POLICY
REVIEW (Dec. 1, 2012), https://www.hoover.org/research/law-and-ethics-robot-soldiers.
91. Austria Working Paper, supra note 82.
92. Id.
93. Ted Shelsby, Iraqi Soldiers Surrender to AAI’s Drones, BALTIMORE SUN (Mar. 2, 1991),
https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-1991-03-02-1991061100-story.html.
94. International Committee of the Red Cross, Ethics and Autonomous Weapon Systems: An Ethical Basis for Human Control?, ¶ 8.1, U.N. Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.5
(Mar. 29, 2018); Report of the 2017 Session of the GGE (Advanced Version), supra note 67.
95. KEY ELEMENTS OF A TREATY, supra note 71, at 3.
96. William Boothby, Article 36, Weapons Reviews and Autonomous Weapons,
Presentation at the 2015 Meeting of Experts on LAWS, 13 to 17 April 2015,
https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/616D2401231649FDC1257E2
90047354D/$file/2015_LAWS_MX_BoothbyS+Corr.pdf.
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target with a smaller munition, such as a vulnerable hatch on an armored
vehicle, with a reduced blast radius, minimizing collateral damage. In that
case, less direct human control over the weapon could produce greater realization of the intention of the commander, which is to destroy the target
while minimizing collateral effects. The United States believes that concerns
expressed through human control can be better addressed by ensuring that
LAWS are subject to “appropriate levels of human judgment.”
B. “Appropriate Levels of Human Judgment”
The DoD requires that autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems
shall be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise “appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force.”97 The United States has
offered this standard during discussions at the GGE, noting that there is no
single metric for determining the correct level of human control or judgment
to be exercised over the use of force in AWS.98 Human judgment over the
use of force is different than human control over the use of force. For example, if the operator is reflexively pressing a button to approve strikes recommended by the weapon system, it could be argued that there is control,
but little judgment is being exercised.99
“Appropriate levels of human judgment” is viewed as a holistic standard
that accounts for the totality of the circumstances in the employment of a
weapon. There is neither a single metric for what constitutes “appropriate
levels,” of judgment, just as there is not for what type of control would be
“meaningful.” Factors that are considered in determining the appropriate
level of human judgment include the characteristics and features of the
weapon system, how it will be employed in a specific physical operating environment, and the tactical context of applicable operational concepts and
rules of engagement.100

97. DoD Directive 3000.09, supra note 18, ¶ 4(a).
98. United States, Human-Machine Interaction, supra note 81, ¶ 1.
99. Id. ¶ 11.
100. ROE ensure force is used consistent with military, political and legal objectives.
See Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement
(SROE)/Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SRUF) for U.S. Forces (2005).
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C. The Fruitless Quest for a Common Standard
The terms under debate at the GGE are semantic, and labels only gain importance once they are defined or explained.101 The disconnect between the
two competing standards of human-machine integration is widened by additional concepts offered for consideration. Australia suggests that any use of
force by LAWS must be executed through a “system of control,” which it
defines as “an incremental, layered approach,” to exercise human control
over the weapons, from “design through to engagement.”102 France has
claimed that there is “no way to define the contours” of each actor’s responsibility–the political and military decision-makers, manufacturers, programmers and operators of LAWS.103 It is apparent many participants in the debate over autonomous weapons are talking past each other.104 This dysfunctional dynamic of the negotiations is evident in the array of terms represented
in the table below used during discussions of human-machine interaction in
the development, deployment, and use of LAWS.
Maintaining
Ensuring
Exerting
Preserving

Substantive
Meaningful
Appropriate
Sufficient
Minimum level of
Minimum
indispensable extent of

Human

Participation
Involvement
Responsibility
Supervision
Validation
Control
Judgment
Decision

Table: Terms listed non-exhaustively by the Chair for further discussion.105

101. Merel Ekelhof, Moving Beyond Semantics on Autonomous Weapons: Meaningful Human
Control in Operation, 10 GLOBAL POLICY 343, 344 (Table 1) (2019), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1758-5899.12665.
102. Australia, Australia’s System of Control and Applications for Autonomous
Weapon Systems, ¶¶ I.3, II, U.N Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2019/WP.2/Rev.1 (Mar. 26, 2019).
103. France, Legal Framework for Any Potential Development and Operational Use of
Future Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) 2, (2016 Meeting of Experts on
LAWS, Working Paper, Apr. 2016).
104. McDougall, supra note 67, at 60.
105. Report of the 2018 Session of the GGE, supra note 67, annex III, ¶ 22.
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The quest to develop a standard for human-machine integration in
LAWS is motivated by the desire to ensure that humans, who are responsible
under LOAC for decisions on the battlefield, are held accountable for the
results of those decisions. Human control over AI systems will be exercised
in a different manner because it changes the tasks that humans do in armed
conflict, but it does not take away the responsibility of humans to create a
gap in accountability. But no matter what terms or standards are used, for
some observers, if there is a gap it can never be closed for AI systems because the machine has an informational advantage over the operator,
whether it is in navigation of autonomous vehicles or radar-based flight control.106 Humans are too slow, incapable of sifting through enough data
quickly enough to control the analytical process. This perspective concludes
that the designer of the machine gradually loses control over it, transferring
control from the human to the machine itself.107 Humans in the loop are not
just redundant–as illustrated by the Aegis system–they are disadvantageous.108
In this respect, it is difficult not to conclude that it will be impossible to
assign human responsibility for the actions of AWS through some type of
globally-accepted standard.109 As Russia stated, “[a]ttempts to develop certain universal parameters of the so-called “critical functions,” for the wide
variety of anticipated systems, “can hardly give practical results.”110 In the
end, the CCW GGE process likely will prove a disappointment. Any agreement that emerges from the GGE is likely to be too vague to provide meaningful guidance.
Fortunately, no new legal standard is needed to ensure accountability of
AWS during armed conflict. The existing principles and rules in LOAC already provide a comprehensive and coherent framework that governs the
use of force, including AI networked weapons. Human accountability for
the employment and effects of AI weapons derives from the military doctrine of command accountability. The commander has direct or individual
accountability for all actions taken during war, including the employment of
LAWS. Military commanders bear the burden of full accountability for the
entire scope of their prosecution of the war effort, including employment of
106. Matthias, supra note 59, at 182.
107. Id.
108. Robert Sparrow, Killer Robots, 24 JOURNAL OF APPLIED PHILOSOPHY 62, 68 (2007).
109. Id.
110. Russia’s Approaches to the Elaboration of a Working Definition and Basic Functions of LAWS, supra note 76, ¶ 9.
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appropriate weapons during the conflict, how those weapons are applied in
the operational environment, and the consequences for their successes and
their failures, both anticipated and unforeseen.
V.

MILITARY ACCOUNTABILITY

Regardless of the standards for human involvement or oversight of AWS
that may be adopted by the GGE, it is clear the law binds humans, not machines.111 Commanders are required to select appropriate and lawful weapons under the circumstances. Some weapons, such as biological weapons or
poisonous gas, are illegal per se. The Annexed Regulations of Hague Convention (IV) prohibit the use of certain weapons that are “calculated to cause
unnecessary suffering,” and customary law prohibits indiscriminate methods
and means of warfare.112 The legality of most weapons, however, is based on
how they are employed by combatants and under the direction of a commander. For example, a rifle is a lawful weapon, but soldiers may on their
own use it in an unlawful manner or officers may direct its misuse through
unlawful orders. Likewise, AWS may be appropriate in one circumstance or
operational environment but not in another. In both cases, the commander
remains accountable for the discharge of the round. The key for accountability is that someone is held to account for every method and means of
warfare, and that person is the military commander.
All members of the U.S. armed forces have a duty to comply with the
law of war.113 The United States believes that compliance with the law of war
aids the commander and the Nation by reinforcing military effectiveness
through disciplining the application of force and economy of effort, encouraging reciprocal respect for the rules by the enemy, and maintaining public
support and legitimacy for the war effort in a democracy.114 The DoD Law
of War Program requires U.S. forces to maintain a system of reporting concerning incidents that a unit commander or other responsible official determines, based on credible information, potentially involves: a war crime; other
violations of the law of war; or conduct during military operations that would
111. Marco Sassóli, Autonomous Weapons and International Humanitarian Law: Advantages,
Open Technical Questions and Legal Issues to be Clarified, 90 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 308,
323 (2014).
112. Hague Regulations, supra note 29, art. 23(e). See also 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 45, rr. 11, 70.
113. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 28, §§ 18.3, 18.3.1.1.
114. Id. § 18.2.
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be a war crime if the military operations occurred in the context of an armed
conflict.115 This program also requires the personal involvement of commanders who convene and direct investigations and refer matters to courts
marital, or to more senior authorities, for disposition.116
Subordinate commanders have a duty to keep immediate superiors appraised of events and incidents during hostilities.117 All military and U.S. civilian employees, contractor personnel, and subcontractors assigned to or
accompanying a DoD Component must report through their chain of command all reportable incidents, including those involving allegations of nonDoD personnel having violated the law of war.118 Violations of “reportable
incidents” may be made to military police, judge advocates, or inspectors
general. All reports must be forwarded immediately through the chain of
command to the combatant commander by the most expeditious means
available.119 If warranted, criminal cases may be brought under the Uniform
Code of Military Justice.120 Suspected violators may be charged with “grave
breaches” of the Geneva Conventions, which entail violations against designated protected persons or property.121 Furthermore, such violations are
subject to universal jurisdiction, and include murder, torture, mutilation or
maiming, inhumane treatment, or willfully causing great suffering or injury,
and they are punishable by death.122 AP I adds other offenses to the list of
grave breaches: attacks that unleash dangerous forces that will produce “excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilians objects,” and
attacks on demilitarized zones and undefended localities.123
Commanders are said to be “in command,” meaning they have authority
over the armed forces, and the “power to give orders and enforce

115. DoD Directive 2311.01, supra note 35, § G.2.
116. See Headquarters, Department of the Army, AR 15-6, Procedures for Administrative Investigations and Boards of Officers (2016); Headquarters, Department of the Army,
AR 195-2, Criminal Investigation Activities (2020).
117. U.S. Department of Navy, United States Navy Regulations ¶ 0706 (rev. ed., 1990)
[hereinafter Navy Regulations] (Responsibility and Authority of Commanders.).
118. DoD Directive 2311.01, supra note 35, § 4.1(a).
119. Id. § 4.2
120. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–906(a) (2018).
121. Geneva Convention I, supra note 43, art. 50; Geneva Convention II, supra note 43,
art.51; Geneva Convention III, supra note 43, art.130; Geneva Convention IV, supra note
43, art.. 147.
122. War Crimes, 18 U.S. Code § 2441 (2018).
123. Additional Protocol I, supra note 29, arts. 85(3)(c), 85(3)(d), 59(1).
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obedience.”124 Commanders are the agents of the State, they exercise authority to control the forces under their command and implement and enforce
the law of war.125 With the vast authority of commanders comes great responsibility while they serve in command. These leaders have authority commensurate with their responsibilities, exercised through intermediate subordinate commanders.126
A. The Military Doctrine of Command Accountability
By whatever title they take–commander, commanding officer, commandant–officers who lead units of the armed forces are accountable for the
performance of the forces subject to their authority.127 In U.S. joint force
doctrine, the term “command” is all-encompassing, to include the authority
and responsibility to organize, direct, coordinate, and control military forces
to accomplish missions.128 It also includes responsibility for health, welfare,
morale and discipline of all subordinates. The art of command flows from
the commander’s ability to use leadership to maximize performance.129
“Clear commander’s guidance and intent, enriched by the commander’s experience and intuition, enable joint forces to achieve objectives.”130 Historically, the most senior military officers were held accountable for the general
performance of their troops in combat. The commander leads through a
combination of “courage, ethical leadership, judgment, intuition, situational
awareness, and the capacity to consider contrary views….”131 In the Navy,
commanders are required to observe the principles of international law.132 In
order to fulfill that responsibility, if there is a conflict between international
law and other Navy regulations, commanders are authorized to uphold
124. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 28, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90.
125. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 28, § 18.4. See Geneva Convention I, supra
note 43, art. 45; Geneva Convention II, supra note 43, art. 46; Convention No. X for the
Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention art. 19, Oct
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2371, T.S. No. 543.
126. Navy Regulations, supra note 117, ¶ 0702 (Responsibility and Authority of Commanders).
127. Id. ¶ 0802 (Responsibility).
128. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-0 CH1, Joint Operations ¶ II-2 (rev. ed., Oct.
2018).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Navy Regulations, supra note 117, ¶ 0705 (Observance of International Law).
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international law.133 The Hague Regulations hold commanders are directly or
individually responsible for methods and means of warfare during the conduct of hostilities.134
American commanders must authorize the employment of any method
or means of war and craft appropriate rules of engagement that accomplish
the mission. Obedience to orders is a cornerstone of military discipline and
order, and while subordinates owe obedience only to lawful orders, all orders
are presumed to be lawful unless that presumption is rebutted.135 Accountability for these orders has always been an inherent element of U.S. military
leadership.136 Punishment for violations of LOAC fall on individuals for the
commission of acts committed at their order or command or acts they personally commit.137
In the aftermath of World War I and II, States recognized that any person, including heads of state or commanders-in-chief, are subject to the laws
of war and are liable to criminal prosecution for their violation. 138 Military
commanders are accountable for violations of LOAC that they personally
commit or that they order their subordinates to commit.139 Leaders may be
held personally accountable for committing an offense, even when subordinates physically fulfill the material elements of the crime they have directed.140 For example, commanders are directly liable for a range of international criminal acts that they commit during the conduct of hostilities: crimes
against peace (planning and initiating war of aggression); war crimes
133. Id.
134. Hague Regulations, supra note 29, art. 1.
135. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 124, art. 33.
136. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 28, § 18.2.
137. Hans Kelsen, Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law with Particular
Regard to the Punishment of War Criminals, 31 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 530, 542 (1943).
138. Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties,
14 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 95, 117 (1920), reprinted from Pamphlet
No. 32, Division of International Law, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 7, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1548, 82 U.N.T.S. 288
[hereinafter Nuremberg Charter].
139. United States v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19, 27 (1973); Prosecutor v. Milošević, IT-98291/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 966 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Dec. 12, 2007),
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragomir_milosevic/tjug/en/071212.pdf (the accused was
in “command and control of his troops”); Hague Regulations, supra note 29, art. 1.
140. Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998), https://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/tjug/
en/981116_judg_en.pdf; Prosecutor v. Prlić, Case No. IT-04-74-T, Judgment, ¶ 239 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia May 29, 2013), https://www.icty.org/
x/cases/prlic/tjug/en/130529-1.pdf.
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(violations of the laws or customs of war); and crimes against humanity, including murder, extermination, and enslavement.141 The commander’s direct
or individual accountability includes genocide and crimes against humanity
that are committed by their forces at their direction, and for the consequences of decisions they have made or authorized for the employment of
weapons on the battlefield.
Commanders are individually subject to prosecution for violation of
other crimes as well, including planning violations of LOAC.142 The commander is accountable for employment of indiscriminate methods or means.
Nazi Germany’s V-1 and V-2 rockets were indiscriminate missiles because
they could not be directed at a target. They were used as terrorizing weapons
by randomly landing in civilian areas.143 The developers of those missiles,
principally Waffen-SS General Hans Kammler and Wernher von Braun,
avoided criminal prosecution after the war because Kammler was reportedly
never found, and von Braun benefited from his singular importance to the
fledgling American missile program. Perhaps more compelling in the case of
von Braun, however, was that the Allies had engaged in even more destructive, indiscriminate bombing of Axis cities. Some 25,000-35,000 civilians
died in four brutal firebombing raids on Dresden in February 1945, while
the V-2 rocket is estimated to have killed fewer than 3,000 Londoners.144
Similarly, Nazi Grand Admiral Karl Döenitz, was tried and convicted at
Nuremberg for war crimes committed during the war for his role as the commander-in-chief of the German Navy. The International Military Tribunal
(IMT) found that the Admiral’s order to sink neutral vessels without warning
when found within declared operational areas was a violation of the 1936
Naval Protocol, which reaffirmed the rules of submarine warfare set out in
the 1930 London Naval Agreement.145 He was also found guilty of violating
the rescue provisions of the Protocol, finding that “if the commander cannot
141. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 138, art. 6(c).
142. ILIAS BANTAKAS, PRINCIPLES OF DIRECT AND SUPERIOR RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 43–49 (2002)
143. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 78, ¶ 1958.
144. Valentine Low, German Report Says Dresden Firebomb Toll Was Exaggerated, TIMES
(London) (Mar. 18, 2010), https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/german-report-says-dresden-firebomb-toll-was-exaggerated-bl8ftqqs9b2 (an estimated 25,000 civilians died in the
Dresden bombings); DENNIS PISZKIEWICZ, THE NAZI ROCKETEERS: DREAMS OF SPACE
AND CRIMES OF WAR 197 (1995) (in the United Kingdom, over 2,700 people were killed by
over 1,300 V-2 rockets fired during the war).
145. 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER 1945 – 1 OCTOBER 1946, at 312 (1947).
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rescue, then under its terms he cannot sink a merchant vessel and should
allow it to pass harmless before his periscope.”146
However, in view of the conduct and arming of British merchant ships
during the war, the IMT did not find Admiral Döenitz guilty for his conduct
of unrestricted submarine warfare against British armed merchant ships. 147
Because of the British Admiralty’s order of May 8, 1940, that “all vessels
should be sunk at night in the Skagerrak,” and the fact that the United States
admitted to conducting unrestricted submarine warfare in the Pacific Ocean
from the first day it entered the war against Japan in 1941, the admiral was
not sentenced for his breaches of the international law of submarine warfare.148 (Döenitz was convicted and served ten years for separate “crimes
against the peace”).
In all cases, commanders are accountable for the operational and legal
judgments inherent in warfighting. Commanders employing an AI weapon
system are no different. They have an obligation to understand what AWS
can do in a particular environment in which it is used, like any other
weapon.149 They must know how the system responds in the field or at sea,
where it excels and what are its limitations. They are not required to understand the intricacies of how the weapon works–the science and technology
behind its performance–only appreciate how it functions and performs in
the battlespace in which it is employed. In the event an AWS proves to be
indiscriminate the commander would be held to account. Every weapon system in the combat zone and every method of training – tactics, techniques
and procedures – falls within the remit of the commander’s direct or individual accountability.
Human Rights Watch worries that it is “arguably unjust” to hold commanders to account for the action of machines “over which they could not
have sufficient control.”150 “These weapons’ autonomy creates a ‘responsibility gap,’” making it “arguably unjust to hold people responsible where they
“could not have sufficient control.”151 This notion of responsibility, however, is too narrow, swallowed by military accountability. Although it may
seem “unfair” to impose liability on commanders for incidents occurring
146. Id. at 313.
147. Id. at 312.
148. Id. at 313.
149. DoD Directive 3000.09, supra note 18, ¶ 4(a)(1)(a).
150. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST KILLER ROBOTS 42 (2012), https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/11/19/losing-humanity/case-againstkiller-robots.
151. Id.
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beyond their immediately control, and to sanction them even for mishaps
they sought to avoid, the armed forces routinely do just that.152 The U.S.
armed forces consistently impose accountability on commanders for literally
everything that occurs throughout his or her entire force, from sexual harassment to peacetime ship collisions to battlefield disasters. The burden of
command, and the unique exposure to perhaps “unfair” liability is simply
part of direct or individual command accountability and it is subsumed by
the duty owed by commanders to the armed forces and to the Nation they
serve.
As Marco Sassóli states, “it is as fair to hold a commander of a robot
accountable as it would be to hold accountable a commander who instructs
a pilot to bomb a target he describes as a military headquarters, but which
turns out to be a kindergarten.”153 The commander’s accountability, in this
regard, is complete, even if some outsiders view it as “unfair”–even if the
commander had no way of personally intervening to ensure a better outcome, indeed even if the commander optimized training and preparation of
his or her forces to avoid such an outcome. This is the approach used in
warship collisions and other operational mishaps in order to hold leaders
accountable and to develop “lessons learned” to avert future incidents. In
the culture of direct accountability within the armed forces, loss of faith or
confidence in the individual commander can result in criminal or administrative sanctions. For example, after the June 2017 collision by the USS Fitzgerald into the Motor Vessel Acx Crystal that killed seven sailors, the commanding officer and the officer in charge of the combat information center
were issued letters of censure.154 The evidence was deemed insufficient to
prevail against them in a criminal trial, even though the investigation uncovered ineffective command and control and deficiencies in training and navigational skill.155 In cases in which LOAC violations do not rise to the level
152. Robert Sparrow, Killer Robots, 24 JOURNAL OF APPLIED PHILOSOPHY 62, 74 (2007).
153. Marco Sassóli, Autonomous Weapons and International Humanitarian Law: Advantages,
Open Technical Questions and Legal Issues to be Clarified, 90 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 308,
324 (2014).
154. Geoff Ziezulewicz, Worse Than You Thought: Inside the Secret Fitzgerald Probe the Navy
Doesn’t Want You to Read, NAVYTIMES, (Jan. 13, 2019), https://www.navytimes.com/
search/22606662/?q=Worse+Than+You+Thought%3A+Inside+the+Secret+Fitzgerald+Probe+the+Navy+Doesn%E2%80%99t+Want+You+to+Read.
155. The investigation determined that the collision and fatalities resulted from: (1)
Failure to plan for safety; (2) failure to adhere to sound navigation practice; (3) failure to
execute basic watch standing practices; (4) failure to properly use available navigation tools;
439

International Law Studies

2021

of war crimes, States typically pursue administrative mechanisms of accountability, initiating investigations and imposing non-judicial punishment or administrative censure.156
As a supplement to the criminal process, “administrative procedures, inquiries, sanctions, and reforms” may be used to respond to violations of
LOAC, such as negligent actions that lack criminal culpability.157 For example, the investigation of the shootdown by the USS Vincennes of Iran Air
Flight 655 on July 3, 1988, exonerated the commanding officer of the warship. In that case, the commanding officer gave the order to target what he
thought was an Iranian F-14 aircraft inbound to attack his warship–a calculation that proved tragically wrong. Two-hundred ninety civilian Iranian lives
were lost. After an investigation, the Secretary of Defense concluded that the
captain acted prudently, given the high threat environment and previous attacks and demonstrations of hostile intent by the forces of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy on U.S. warships.158 The investigating officer,
a rear admiral, recommended that no administrative or criminal action
should be taken against the captain. This recommendation was endorsed by
the Secretary of Defense.159
Similarly, Laura Dickinson recounts administrative findings of a U.S.
Army investigation on the errant U.S. airstrike on October 3, 2015, against a
Kunduz, Afghanistan, hospital operated by the humanitarian organization
Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) that killed 24 patients, fourteen staff members

and (5) failure to respond deliberately and effectively when in extremis. See Memorandum
from Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy, to Distribution,
Collision Report for USS Fitzgerald and USS John S. McCain Collisions, http://s3.amazonaws.com/CHINFO/USS+Fitzgerald+and+USS+John+S+McCain+Collision+Reports.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2021).
156. Laura A. Dickinson, Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems: The Overlooked Importance of
Administrative Accountability, in THE IMPACT OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES ON THE LAW
OF ARMED CONFLICT 69, 84–85 (Ronald T.P. Alcala & Eric Talbot Jensen eds., 2019).
157. Id. at 71.
158. Memorandum from Secretary of Defense to Secretary of the Navy, Formal Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Downing of Iran Air Flight 655 on 3 July
1988, at 61 (Aug. 19, 1988), https://www.jag.navy.mil/library/investigations/VINCENNES%20INV.pdf.
159. Rear Admiral William H. Fogarty, USN, Investigation Report, Formal Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Downing of a Commercial Airliner by the USS
Vincennes (CG 49) on 3 July 1988 (July 28, 1988), id., attachment at 51.
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and four caretakers.160 A cascade of errors led to the tragic airstrike. Some of
those involved received administrative penalties or disciplinary action, although they were not charged with a crime.161 A comprehensive review of
tactical directives, pre-deployment training, and rules of engagement followed.162 The Secretary of Defense took corrective action to avoid another
such incident. The military departments were directed to review commandand-control systems to ensure that they could maintain a “unified understanding of the battle space and enhance interoperability.”163 In another incident, this one in Iraq in 2003, Lieutenant Colonel Allen West was fined
$5,000 and retired after he was found to have threatened the life of an Iraqi
by discharging a firearm.164 These cases demonstrate that DoD investigates
mishaps and reviews decisions during hostilities, and takes administrative action to supplement criminal prosecution. These measures hold military leaders accountable through non-judicial and administrative processes in cases
lacking criminal culpability to obtain convictions at trial.
Commanders may also be held responsible for violations of LOAC committed by their subordinates if they have failed to properly train their force,
exercise appropriate oversight, or establish guidance and expectations in
command environment conducive to compliance with the law. The international law doctrine of command responsibility is a subset of the military doctrine of command accountability.

160. Dickinson, supra note 156, at 84–85. See Alissa J. Rubin, Airstrike Hits Doctors Without Borders Hospital in Afghanistan, NEW YORK TIMES (Oct. 3, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/04/world/asia/afghanistan-bombing-hospital-doctors-without-borders-kunduz.html; Tim Craig, Doctors Without Borders says U.S. Airstrike Hit Hospital in Afghanistan; at Least 19 Dead, WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 3, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/doctors-without-borders-airstrike-hits-afghan-hospital-killing-3-staffers/2015/10/03/2ed13104-b50a-48ec-9eb9-92db8ee3a876_story.html.
161. Jim Garamone, Centcom Commander: Communications Errors, Human Error Led to Attack on Afghan Hospital, U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE (Apr. 29, 2016), https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/746393/centcom-commander-communications-breakdowns-human-errors-led-to-attack-on-afgha/.
162. Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Military
Departments et al., Secretary of Defense Guidance (Apr. 28, 2016),
https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=792301.
163. Id.
164. U.S. Officer Fined for Harsh Interrogation Tactics, CNN.COM (Dec. 13, 2003),
https://www.cnn.com/2003/US/12/12/sprj.nirq.west.ruling/. Allen West went on to
serve one term in the U.S. House of Representatives, representing Florida’s 22nd congressional district from 2011 to 2013.
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B. The International Legal Doctrine of Command Responsibility
With military command comes the special duty of oversight. Commanders
must ensure that their forces are properly trained and adopt and enforce
rules and procedures for investigating suspected violations of LOAC and
impose administrative, disciplinary and penal actions to correct them.165
Commanders have an obligation to take measures within their power and
appropriate to the circumstances to prevent violations by the forces under
their command.166
The United States extends this classic legal doctrine of “command responsibility” to its outer boundaries. As the Supreme Court held in the Yamashita decision, U.S. commanders are responsible “to some extent” even for
the actions of their subordinates.167 Edging close to vicarious liability, the
U.S. position underscores the vast authority and virtually plenary responsibility of U.S. military commanders for the decisions of subordinates. Liability
attaches to the most senior commander who issues the orders, downward to
all of the subordinate commanders who transmit and distribute it throughout
the chain of command.
The legal doctrine of command or superior responsibility holds the superior officer accountable for the failure to prevent or punish many of the
war crimes committed by subordinates.168 This legal concept holds the commander liable for “willful blindness” for failing to prevent or stop the illegal
acts of his or her subordinates.169 Commanders have an affirmative duty to
prevent LOAC violations, and they may acquire derivative, imputed liability
by commission or omission.170 They are also responsible for decisions by
their subordinates to disregard LOAC violations committed by their forces
that they are aware of, or reasonably should have been aware of, or that they

165. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 28, §§ 18.4.4, 18.4.2–18.4.3.
166. Id. § 18.4. See also Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1946); French Ordinance of August 28, 1944, Concerning the Suppression of War Crimes art. 4, quoted in 4 LAW REPORTS
OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 87 (1948).
167. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 15.
168. Nico Keijzer, A Plea for the Defence of the Superior Order, 8 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 78, 80–84 (1978); YORAM DINSTEIN, THE DEFENCE OF ‘OBEDIENCE TO
SUPERIOR ORDERS’ IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, at viii–ix (2012).
169. Delalić, supra note 140; Prlić, supra note 140, ¶ 387.
170. GEOFFREY S. CORN, KEN WATKIN & JAMIE WILLIAMSON, THE LAW IN WAR: A
CONCISE OVERVIEW 234 (2018).
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acquiesced in or failed to take action to punish.171 Liability extends beyond
the direct perpetrators of the crime.172 Commanders also bear responsibility
for violations of LOAC that they incite, such as placing enemy prisoners of
war in a place of risk from lynching by an angry mob.173 Military leaders have
a duty to take “necessary and reasonable measures” to ensure their forces do
not commit LOAC violations.174 If they do not take such measures they are
answerable for the acts of omission–actions not performed that are required
under international law, such as failure to properly supervise and control
subordinates, and to ensure that they do not perpetrate war crimes. This type
of inaction may be charged as a dereliction of duty.175
Officers are also liable for LOAC violations committed by subordinates
pursuant to manifestly illegal orders they have passed on to those subordinates.176 “Within certain limitations, [subordinate soldiers have] the right to
assume that the orders of his superiors and the State which he serves and
which are issued to him are in conformity with international law.”177 In military targeting, the legal analysis for a particular strike already has been made
by superiors or it is already reduced to a check on the part of the pilot or
soldier, for example, to confirm that the target is indeed the expected

171. Additional Protocol I, supra note 29, art. 86 (failure to act); Delalić, supra note 140,
¶ 313.
172. Additional Protocol I, supra note 29, art. 86 (failure to act); Trial of LieutenantGeneral Shigeru Sawada and Three Others, U.S. Military Commission, Shanghai, Feb. 27–
Apr. 15, 1946, 5 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 1 (1948).
173. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL supra note 28, § 18.23.2. See also Trial of Erich Heyer
and Six Others (The Essen Lynching Case), British Military Court, Dec. 18–22, 1945, 1 LAW
REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 88, 89–90 (1947); BANTAKAS, supra note 142, at
53–56 (2002).
174 DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL supra note 28, § 18.23.3.
175. United States v. Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey R. Chessani (Mar. 7, 2009),
https://www.jag.navy.mil/courts/documents/archive/2009/Chessani,%20J.R.%
20200800299%20unpub.pdf (unreported opinion of the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps Court of
Military Appeals upholding the military judge’s dismissal of the charges due to unlawful
command influence). See also Ellen Knickmeyer, In Haditha, Memories of a Massacre Iraqi Townspeople Describe Slaying of 24 Civilians by Marines in Nov. 19 Incident, WASHINGTON POST (May
27, 2006), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2006/05/27/in-hadithamemories-of-a-massacre-span-classbankheadiraqi-townspeople-describe-slaying-of-24-civilians-by-marines-in-nov-19-incidentspan/2c18d37f-071a-46e1-a0c2-30bbbcb0ba5f/.
176. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL supra note 28, § 18.3.2.1; United States v. von Leeb
(The High Command Case), 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 509, 510–11 (1950).
177. Id. at 511.
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building.178 Individual pilots and soldiers are not making in-depth or complex
legal analysis, which is reserved for higher level echelons. The commander
cannot be criminally liable for mere errors of judgment, and is only accountable for an order that is “criminal on its face.”179 Subordinate members of
the armed forces who carry out the orders are also criminally culpable if the
orders were manifestly illegal (“execute all the prisoners”).180 Subordinate
soldiers may presume the lawfulness of their orders and are not held responsible unless such acts are so evidently unlawful or evil as to prevent any reasonable mistake of their legality.181 A manifestly unlawful order is one in
which a “man of ordinary sense and understanding” would, under the circumstances, know it to be unlawful.182
The legal doctrine of command responsibility extends to actions committed by the forces under the commander’s “effective control,” which
means that there exists a superior-subordinate relationship.183 Such a relationship requires that the superior have more than general influence over the
subordinates, but must have the material ability to prevent or punish the
commission of the crimes. Merely being “tasked with coordination does not
necessarily mean to have command and control.”184 Lesser degrees of control, such as the ability to exercise substantial influence over forces that committed the crimes, is insufficient to establish command responsibility.185
“Effective command and control” and “effective authority and control,”
are synonymous.186 The Statute of the International Criminal Court includes
178. Merel A.C. Ekelhof, Lifting the Fog of Targeting: “Autonomous Weapons” and Human
Control Through the Lens of Military Targeting, 71 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW 1, 24–25
(2018).
179. von Leeb and Others, supra note 176, at 511.
180. DINSTEIN, supra note 168, at 22.
181. This position was adopted in the Leipzig trials after World War I. It has persisted
in contemporary legal doctrine. Id. at 26–35.
182. United States v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19, 27 (1973).
183. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, , supra note 124, art. 28; Prosecutor v. Halilović, Case No. IT-01-48-T, Judgment, ¶ 39 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former
Yugoslavia
Nov.
16,
2005),
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/halilovic/tjug/en/
tcj051116e.pdf; COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS supra note 78, ¶ 3544.
184. Halilović, supra note 183, ¶ 367.
185. Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Judgment Pursuant to
Article 74 of the Statute, ¶ 183 (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/
CourtRecords/CR2016_02238.PDF [hereinafter Gombo Judgment].
186. Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision Pursuant to
Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ¶ 412 (June 15, 2009), https://www.icc444
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both terms.187 Indicators of effective control are more a matter of evidence
than substantive law.188 Evidence demonstrates whether a commander had
the “material ability” or power to prevent offenses and punish their perpetrators.189 Indicia of effective control include the commander’s de jure or de
facto authority to issue orders, especially ordering troops into combat,
whether his or her orders were actually followed, whether materiel and human resources were at his or her discretion, and whether he or she held authority to enforce discipline.190 In short, the vicarious criminal liability that
flows from command responsibility, implicates the commander in many of
the acts of commission or omission that violate LOAC that are committed
by subordinate forces. These forces may include AWS in a mixture of distributed, lethal capabilities on the future battlefield. Even then, command
responsibility will persist as a subset of overall command accountability.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The commander is accountable for battlefield action regardless of whether
subordinates made and compounded errors, machines performed unexpectedly, or an incident arises as an unforeseeable consequence of pure happenstance or the fog of war. The military doctrine of command accountability
may not seem to everyone to be “fair” in that the commander is accountable
for every decision made across the armed forces enterprise and prosecution
of the war effort, including decisions he or she did not make but nonetheless
must answer for. The commander’s direct, individual accountability covers
every aspect of the outcome of specific decisions made by subordinate leaders and service members, failures of intelligence and mission analysis, mistakes made by government and private sector civilians accompanying the
cpi.int/pages/record.aspx?uri=699541. In considering the terms “effective command and
control” or “effective authority and control,” the Court found that the additional words
“command” and “authority” had no substantial effect on the required level or standard of
“control,” since the two terms “effective” and “control” were used as a common denominator in both. Gombo, Judgment, supra note 185, ¶ 180.
187. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 124, art. 28.
188. Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 87–88 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013), https://www.icty.org/x/cases/perisic/acjug/en/130228_judgement.pdf.
189. Id. ¶ 88 (“In addition, the ability to prevent a crime is not necessarily a prerequisite
to proving effective control.”); Prlić, supra note 140, ¶ 244; Prosecutor v. Nizeyimana, Case
No. ICTR-00-55C-A, Judgment, ¶ 342 (Sept 29, 2014), https://unictr.irmct.org/
en/cases/ictr-00-55c.
190. Prlić, supra note 140, ¶ 244.
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force, and malperformance of weapons. Ultimately, the military commander
is accountable for the totality of the employment of forces under his or her
command, from a handgun to a nuclear missile. In this regard, the commander faces criminal, non-judicial and administrative accountability. The
commander’s individual, direct accountability for virtually every line of effort
in prosecuting the war is a strict liability regime of accountability that may
(or may not) involve criminal sanction. While the commander’s accountability may include legal exposure to criminal violations of the law of war, in
military doctrine its reach is much farther, encompassing non-judicial and
even non-legal mechanisms. The commander’s accountability is separate and
distinct from the related legal doctrine in international criminal law of command responsibility, in which the commander may face legal jeopardy for
failure to exercise control over forces under command that violate LOAC.
Commanders authorize lethal force against enemy forces and lawful targets based upon their rules of engagement and subject to LOAC. These orders are informed by the commander’s understanding of the tactical situation, training and experience, and the combination of tactics and weapons
(methods and means). In all cases, the commander is accountable for the
employment of the weapon. In the case of AI, commanders are accountable
for calibrating how AWS are employed, how they will be able to “express
their autonomy,” and designating the parameters or “guardrails” for their
operation.191 If an autonomous system acts beyond its programmed limitations, the military system holds commanders accountable for failing to anticipate or guard against the danger. Commanders are empowered to deploy
weapons and they are accountable if those machines mis-perform. Commanders are accountable to their superiors in the chain of command for the
methods and means of warfare that they set in motion, from missiles that
cannot be recovered in flight to artillery rounds that have left the tube, and
to AWS, which may be equipped to determine targets based on programmed
criteria. The commander’s accountability inures to forces that fire errant or
misguided rounds, weapons that fail to perform as expected, and mistakes
made throughout the kill chain, and employs weapon systems with autonomous functions. This accountability includes criminal and administrative responsibility, in which commanders and combatants bear personal exposure
or liability for the weapons they unleash, and are subject to sanction for violations of the law of war. The pursuit of advancements in weapon systems
191. Marcus Schulzke, Autonomous Weapons and Distributed Responsibility, 26 PHILOSOPHY
& TECHNOLOGY 203, 217 (2013).
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to ensure an effective, efficient, and more humane approach to warfare has
been successful because it is coupled with the culture of accountability in
leadership on the battlefield.
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